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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION-CHILD CUSTODY-
STATE PROCEDURES TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held
that federal habeas corpus is not available to challenge the con-
stitutionality of Pennsylvania's parental rights termination
statute.
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 648
F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2177).
In June, 1971, Marjorie Lehman voluntarily transferred tem-
porary custody of her three minor sons to the Lycoming County
Children's Services Agency (Agency) due to her poor living condi-
tions and the imminent birth of another child.1 After the child's
birth, the Agency remained actively involved with Ms. Lehman'
as her sons were still in foster care.
Ms. Lehman's request for the return of her sons in November,
1974, was refused by the Agency because she was unable to pro-
vide them with the necessary support and supervision.' Subse-
quently, the Agency filed a petition with the Lycoming County
Court of Common Pleas requesting the termination of Ms. Leh-
man's parental rights in order to make her sons eligible for adop-
tion.' The court, rejecting Ms. Lehman's void-for-vagueness
challenge to section 311 of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act,'
1. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2177). Both Ms. Lehman and the
Children's Services Agency caseworker agreed that conditions in her home
were unfit for children. 648 F.2d at 136.
2. Id. at 136-37. The Agency assisted Ms. Lehman in locating new hous-
ing. After some indecision about whether the accommodations should be large
enough for herself and the baby or for the sons as well, Ms. Lehman settled on
an apartment large enough only for the baby and herself. Thereafter, Agency
personnel were required regularly to help Ms. Lehman in a wide range of
everyday activities: nutrition, finances, and child care. See In re William L., 477
Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
3. 648 F.2d at 136.
4. Id. at 136-37. See In re B.E., 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153 (1977) (purpose
of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act of 1970 dealing with the in-
voluntary termination of parental rights, was to abrogate the need for consent
to adoption in cases where the parent has not met the needs of the child).
5. Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 311(2) (Purdon
Supp. 1979), amended by 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2 511(a)(2) (Purdon Supp.
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granted the petition.' On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the adoption statute was not violative of sub-
stantive due process or unconstitutionally vague and upheld the
decision of the lower court.' The United States Supreme Court
denied Ms. Lehman's petition for a writ of certiorari.8 There-
after, on behalf of her sons, Ms. Lehman filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, contending that section 311 was
unconstitutional as applied to her and/or unconstitutional on its
face. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdic-
tion.9 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a divided panel opin-
ion, reversed and held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction may
be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of state parental ter-
mination statutes. 10 On a rehearing en banc, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that federal habeas corpus jur-
isdiction could not be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's statutory procedures for involuntarily ter-
minating parental rights.
Writing for the plurality, Judge Garth 2 emphasized that the
1980), reads in pertinent part:
The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a peti-
tion filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control,
or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the con-
ditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
Id.
6. In re Willman Lehman, No. 2986-88 (C.P. Lycoming Co. filed June 3,
1976).
7. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880
(1978).
8. In re William L., 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Ms. Lehman chose to file for cer-
tiorari rather than exercise her right of direct appeal.
* 9. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, No. 79-65 (M.D.
Pa. filed Sept. 4, 1979). The district court relied on Sylvander v. New England
Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978). See infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
10. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, No. 79-2466 (3d
Cir., July 23, 1980), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, (August 15, 1980).
Judges Rosenn, Garth, and Sloviter were on the panel.
11. Lehamn v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2177).
12. Judges Aldisert, Hunter, and Weis joined the plurality opinion.
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habeas corpus writ, unlike other claims or constitutional chal-
lenges, is not subject to res judicata principles. Restraints of an
individual's liberty are so contrary to important constitutional
rights that the liberty interest will prevail over the finality of
litigation interest embodied in the res judicata doctrine."3
Another extraordinary characteristic of habeas corpus, Judge
Garth asserted, is the use of the writ across judicial systems.
Representing what he termed an unparalleled assertion of juris-
diction by the federal courts," the habeas corpus writ authorizes
a sole federal judge to overrule a state court's final decision on
federal issues. 5 In light of this unique power, the effect on comity
between state and federal judiciaries, and the ability to override
doctrines of res judicata, Judge Garth cautioned that the use of
the writ should be confined to circumstances involving the pres-
ervation of personal liberty and the freedom from unlawful
custody. 8
Judge Garth observed that the writ's requirement that one be
"in custody" was designed to limit its use as a remedy to those
restraints of an immediate and severe nature."7 The plurality also
noted the need to properly limit the reach of the writ, especially
in light of the expanding scope of constitutional litigation. 8
The plurality then contended that the proper focus in the pre-
sent case was whether the termination of parental rights pre-
sented the same, strong claim for overriding the finality interest
as does the plea of a prisoner that his incarceration is in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution. 9 The court concluded,
13. 648 F.2d at 139. Emphasizing the high value accorded personal liberty,
the plurality quoted Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963): "[Cjonventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of
personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review." Id. at 424.
14. 648 F.2d at 139. The writ permits one in custody under a court order to
be heard in a federal court on federal constitutional claims despite the full adju-
dication of the underlying claim in a state court.
15. Id (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)).
16. 648 F.2d at 139.
17. Id. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (remedy for
severe restraints on individual liberty); Note, Developments in the Law - Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970) (restraints impinging with
especial harshness on personal liberty).




relying on the First Circuit's decision in Sylvander v. New
England Home for Little Wanderers,0 that it did not because
habeas corpus challenges unlawful custody, and unlawful custody
is not an issue in parental rights termination cases.21 The plurality
reasoned that the interest sought to be protected in these cases
was not the children's liberty interest but the parent's right to
raise the children. 2
In support of these conclusions, the plurality first maintained
that although incarceration per se is not required for the habeas
corpus writ to issue, custody involving restraint of a type not
shared by the public generally" or involving collateral conse-
quences" is required for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,5 the fed-
20. 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978).
21. 648 F.2d at 141. The plurality .contended that Sylvander was factually
and procedurally similar to the present case. Id. Ms. Sylvander had given cus-
tody of her son to a privately run institution, the New England Home for Little
Wanderers. The home had petitioned the Massachusetts Probate Court for
authority to place the child as available for adoption, without requiring the
mother's consent. The probate court's finding that it was in the child's best in-
terest to be placed in an adoptive home was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. That court also rejected Ms. Sylvander's contention
that the statute's standards were unconstitutional. Her petition for habeas cor-
pus, joined with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, was dismissed by the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Sylvander v. New England Home for
Little Wanderers, 444 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir.
1978). Holding that the section 1983 complaint was barred by res judicata, the
court of appeals also found that the custody required for habeas corpus was not
present because the child was not being detained or under any type of state-
imposed restraint. The Sylvander court determined, therefore, that the rights
asserted by the action were those of the mother and not of one in custody. 584
F.2d at 1112.
22. 648 F.2d at 140.
23. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). An individual under the
supervision of the Parole Board was in custody for habeas corpus purposes
when, suchcustody "involve[d] significant restraints on petitioner's liberty ...
which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the public generally."
Id at 242. See also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. at 351 (release on own
recognizance prior to incarceration was a restraint not shared by the public
generally).
24. See Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). Although the parole status
of the petitioner in Carafas had ended through expiration of his sentence, the
Court held that the case was not moot. The petitioner was found to be in
custody for purposes of the habeas corpus statute because he was subject to
"collateral consequences" and would continue to suffer "disabilities." Id at 237,
239.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) & (b) (1976) provide in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
[Vol. 20:293
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eral habeas corpus statute for state prisoners. When compared
with these standards, the Leman sons' circumstances, Judge
Garth concluded, were not different from other living ar-
rangements, such as foster or parental care, and thus the re-
straint here was one shared by children generally.2"
The plurality then reviewed the First Circuit's decision in Syl-
vander and agreed with its application of law." Moreover, they
concluded that the Lehman boys were also not being detained,
restrained, or held against their will." The plurality also agreed
with the Sylvander court that the parent's rights were actually
represented by the habeas corpus petition, not the children's.
The plurality concluded that a parent's right against deprivation
of his or her children did not involve the requisite custody for a
habeas corpus action.2
Judge Garth rejected Ms. Lehman's attempt to distinguish the
custody battle between natural parents from the termination of
parental rights by the state. He noted that in both situations the
judicial process is used to establish responsibility for the child's
upbringing. Judge Garth reasoned that because the impact on
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or laws or
treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such pro-
cess ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
Id
26. 648 F.2d at 141. Judge Garth stated also that no collateral conse-
quences existed. He added there were no habeas corpus precedents dealing
with the custody requirement which would cover the Lehman children's custody
situation. Id
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Judge Garth characterized
Sylvander as the only case which had analyzed whether the requisite custody
existed in parental determination cases. 648 F.2d at 141. He noted that several
cases have assumed that jurisdiction does exist. Id at 141 n.8. The plurality
noted the similarity of the factual settings, yet pointed out the difference in
procedural approaches. Unlike Ms. Lehman, Ms. Sylvander did not file a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari; however, in neither case was an appeal taken directly
to the Supreme Court. Id at 141.
28. 648 F.2d at 142. Judge Garth noted that he was therefore not in the
kind of custody which has prompted federal courts to assert jurisidiction. Id
29. Id
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the status of the children is the same, if habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion is present in parental termination proceedings, it is present
in intra-family custody disputes. He concluded that the restraint
on the child is indistinguishable in either situation from that
placed on children in general, and is insufficient for habeas cor-
pus purposes.3
Recognizing that an individual state may validly extend the
writ's scope to child custody matters, Judge Garth maintained
that different concerns emerge when federal courts subjugate
the state's finality interest to the federal personal liberty in-
terest. He stated that only those decisions granting federal
habeas corpus relief to one petitioning from a state custody
order could be considered as authoritative"1 and that the
authorities relied on by Ms. Lehman in attempt to extend the
habeas corpus writ to child custody cases were not controlling.2
Examining relevant policy considerations, the plurality observed
that although the child has an interest in finality of litigation to
avoid continuing uncertainty of relationships, 3 the parent does
not and will probably continue to litigate until no forums are
available. Judge Garth contended, therefore, that extending fed-
eral judisdiction to child custody cases would probably not be in
the child's best interest. 4 The plurality explained that while the
child custody present in parental terminations and other child
custody determinations was not alone sufficient for invocation of
30. Id at 142-43. Judge Garth also found no distinction, in terms of the
custody requirement of severe restraints, between the case of the usual custody
battle and that of the state termination proceeding. The plurality was concerned
that if habeas corpus were made available in the state termination cases it
would then be available in parental custody proceedings, thereby involving the
federal courts in areas traditionally reserved to the states. Id at 143 n.11.
31. Id at 143.
32. Ms. Lehman cited as authority for granting habeas corpus: United
States ex reL Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (father's petition for
writ of habeas corpus properly granted); Application of Reed, 447 F.2d 814 (3d
Cir. 1971) (federal district court had jurisdiction to grant writ); Wisconsin Poto-
watomis v. Welsey, 377 F. Supp. 1153 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (denied, pending a state
court judgment); Young v. Minton, 344 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (father's
petiton for habeas corpus granted). See Brief for Appellant at 18. Judge Garth
stated that none of these cases would support the use of the writ in Lehman.
648 F.2d at 143.
33. By analogy to the prisoner who is able to put an end to his litigation,
the plurality recognized the inability of a child to do likewise. 648 F.2d at 144.
See Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1112.
34. 648 F.2d at 144.
298 [Vol. 20:293
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federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, all federal habeas corpus peti-
tions on behalf of children are not precluded. 5
The plurality rejected Ms. Lehman's argument that she was
entitled to a federal forum for her federal claims, but stated that
federal review had been available to Ms. Lehman had she chosen
to pursue different procedures to obtain it."6 The plurality con-
cluded its discussion by stating that because child custody dis-
putes are no more than disputes over which party shall have
responsibility for the child, the federal personal liberty interest
is not sufficiently strong to extend federal habeas corpus relief. 7
In his concurrence,38 Judge Adams conceded that the Lehman
sons' situation did technically comply with the language of the
habeas corpus statute.39 He stated that the writ's usage had
never been constrained by formalistic application, but was guided
35. Id If a case would present sufficient restraint or incarceration impos-
ing on a child's liberty interest the writ would probably issue. See Sylvander,
584 F.2d at 1113.
36. 648 F.2d at 144. Judge Garth stated that there is no inherent right to
have federal claims considered in a federal court. Id See Allen v. McCurry, 445
U.S. 958 (1980) (inability to obtain federal habeas corpus relief does not render
collateral estoppel inapplicable to a section 1983 action). He then observed that
although one who loses a federal constitutional challenge to a state statute in a
state court has a right of direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, see
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976), Ms. Lehman instead chose to petition for a writ of
certiorari, allegedly to avoid the res judicata effect of a possible summary affir-
mance by the Supreme Court. He also noted that federal review could be ob-
tained by reserving federal claims during state court litigation and then pursu-
ing the challenge of the state statute's constitutionality in a federal court
through a section 1983 action. 648 F.2d at 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or cause to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id The res judicata effect has been limited by the rule requiring section 1983
claims to have been actually litigated in state courts in order to invoke the res
judicata bar. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978).
37. 648 F.2d at 146.
38. Judges Aldisert, Hunter, and Weis joined in this concurring opinion.
39. 648 F.2d at 146 (Adams, J., concurring). Using the language of the
statute itself, Judge Adams stated the children were "in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court ... in violation of the Constitution" and the "ap-
plicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) & (b) (1976). See supra note 25.
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by common law and historic applications." Judge Adams observed,
however, that common law alone does not provide sufficient
guidance because there was no federal system at common law
and parental termination proceedings were uncommon.4
Although Ms. Lehman had agreed that federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction should not be extended to the intra-family custody
dispute, she had urged that the state termination proceedings
are distinguishable by virtue of the state's involvement and,
therefore, common law precedents remain available as support
for habeas corpus relief. Judge Adams rejected this argument by
pointing out that the common law precedents relied upon involved
intra-family custody disputes.4"
Judge Adams then reviewed the statutory history of habeas
corpus jurisdiction as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court4 and was persuaded that child custody issues had not
been included in legislative or judicial extension of the custody
requirement.44 He emphasized that the writ had been used large-
ly to challenge criminal sanctions.45 Considering the impact of the
termination proceedings on the Lehman children, Judge Adams
determined that they did not have an interest which warranted
40. 648 F.2d at 147 (Adams, J., concurring). See Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. at 238, 243.
41. 648 F.2d at 147 (Adams, J., concurring).
42. Id at 147 n.6 (Adams, J., concurring).-
43. Id. at 148-49 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams described the his-
tory of habeas corpus jurisdiction, specifically the federal courts' issuance of the
writ on allegations of custody in violation of federal law, as "one of carefully
controlled statutory expansion." Id at 148 (Adams, J., concurring). But see infra
note 90 and accompanying text. After noting that the scope of federal habeas
power was originally defined in section 14 of the, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
14, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)), Judge Adams iden-
tified two significant Supreme Court interpretations of section 14: Ex parte
Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845) (federal courts lacked the power to issue habe-
as corpus writ to one in custody under order of state court, whether civil or
criminal) and Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (judicial authority to
issue writ must be founded on statutory authorization).
44. 648 F.2d at 150 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams noted that de-
spite amendments, in terms of permissible usages, to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress did not indicate a desire to include child custody matters. He stated
that review of the legislative history of section 2254's statutory predecessor
"significantly fails to mention challenges to termination of parental rights as
among the intended uses of habeas." 648 F.2d at 150 (Adams, J., concurring).
45. Id- Judge Adams pointed out that section 2254 speaks in terms of "the
rights of the prisoner." See supra note 25.
300 [Vol. 20:293
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extension of the habeas corpus writ." He concluded that if fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction was desired in the child custody
area, Congress, exercising its constitutional authority to estab-
lish the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, should amend
section 2254.'
Judge Adams next stated that even if it were proper to ex-
tend jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute to the Lehman
sons, it was necessary to examine the propriety of the parent
bringing the habeas corpus action on behalf of the children after
parental rights had been terminated. He acknowledged that the
parent has the primary authority to provide for the care of a
child and that the integrity of the family is protected from state
interference.'8 Judge Adams noted that while children and
parents have reciprocal interests, children also have independent
private interests not shared by parents. 9 The state also has an
interest in the child's welfare, Judge Adams stated, and can set
limits to insure a minimum level of physical and mental health.5 1
He concluded that once the rights of the parent had been ter-
minated, the presumption that the parent is representing the
child's interests is no longer valid and that their interests actually
diverge. 1 He maintained that because Ms. Lehman was attacking
the state's termination standard, which presumbaly represented
the standard designed to protect the children's well being, her
action potentially undermined the interest of the children in a
minimum parent-child relationship."
46. Id. at 150-51 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams based his conclusion
on the absence of demonstrative data that the state's activities here were so
unfair or inequitable as to seriously jeopardize the family unity and on the fact
the record was devoid of "cavalier disregard of parental rights" by the state's
executive or judicial branches. Id.
47. Id. at 151 (Adams, J., concurring). See supra note 25.
48. Id. at 152 (Adams, J., concurring). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972) (Supreme Court' has emphasized the importance of the family).
49. 648 F.2d at 152 (Adams, J., concurring). See Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (child has privacy interest which parent
cannot represent).
50. 648 F.2d at 153 (Adams, J., concurring). See Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (limit on freedom of parent to affect child's welfare set by
state).
51. 648 F.2d at 153-54 n.47 (Adams, J., concurring). See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. at 649, 652 (no question that neglected children may be removed from
their parents).
52. 648 F.2d at 154 (Adams, J., concurring). Factors mentioned specifically
by Judge Adams as indicating the possible conflict-of-interests between parent
1982]
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The divergence of the parent-child interests was also apparent
to Judge Adams when viewed from the perspective of finality.
The interest of the parent in restoring the family unit by contin-
uing litigation is diametrically opposed to the children's interest
in acquiring a pernament parental-type relationship by ending
litigation.53 Because the federal court was without jurisidiction
and because Ms. Lehman lacked standing to assert a habeas cor-
pus action on behalf of the children, Judge Adams would affirm
the district court's judgment. '
Chief Judge Seitz, also concurring, agreed with Judge Adams
that the case did technically conform to the statutory re-
quirements for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.5 However, he
reasoned that using the federal habeas corpus statute to chal-
lenge state child custody proceedings was a new development,
without pertinent precedent, and therefore a significant depar-
ture from its traditional uses.58 He urged that because intra-
family custody disputes also would fall within the literal reading
of the statute, the courts should refrain from this expansion of
habeas corpus jurisdiction and permit Congress to decide
whether such expansion was proper.57
Judge Rosenn dissented, asserting that because the plurality
incorrectly perceived the issue before the court as being merely
who shall raise the children, they found the federal interest in
personal liberty insufficiently implicated to give rise to federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction.58 Judge Rosenn maintained that the
issue was the narrower one of whether the district court was in-
correct in dismissing Ms. Lehman's habeas corpus petition chal-
and child were the voluntary relinquishing of custody for ten years, the devel-
opment of ties with persons in loco parentis, and the intervention by the state.
Id. at 154-55 (Adams, J., concurring). He noted that Ms. Lehman may have
standing to challenge the infringement of her rights by some direct action but
he questioned the use of habeas corpus which must be brought on behalf of the
children. Id. at 154 (Adams, J., concurring).
53. Id See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
54. 648 F.2d at 155 (Adams, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Seitz, C.J., concurring). See supra note 25.
56. 648 F.2d at 155 (Adams, J., concurring). See Sylvander, 584 F.2d at
1109, 1113; supra, note 21.
57. 648 F.2d at 156 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
58. Id at 156 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See 648 F.2d at 146. Judges Higgin-
botham and Sloviter joined in this dissent.
[Vol. 20:293
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lenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute for lack
of jurisdiction. 9
Judge Rosenn stated that he disagreed with the Sylvander
decision"0 and the conclusions that the plurality drew from it.61
Because Sylvander involved custody held by a private adoption
agency, Judge Rosenn stated that it had limited relevance to the
Lehman case which involved state action.2
Judge Rosenn noted that jurisdiction consists of the abstract
power to hear a case and should not depend on the disposition on
the merits in the state court. He deemed the resolution of two
questions necessary to decide this case: first, whether the fed-
eral habeas corpus statute conferred jurisdiction for federal re-
view of state custody proceedings which terminated parental
rights; and second, whether exercising such jurisdiction conform-
ed with federal and state comity concerns and related policy con-
siderations.13
Judge Rosenn summarized the history of the writ's custody re-
quirement for jurisdiction through the common law, the Constitu-
tion, and subsequent statutory extensions of habeas jurisdic-
tion." Examining the federal habeas corpus statute, Judge
59. Id at 156 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
60. Id at 158 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
61. 648 F.2d at 158 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn found Sylvander
distinguishable because Ms. Sylvander surrendered custody of her child shortly
after birth to a private adoption agency. The private agency, not the state, peti-
tioned to place the child without the mother's permission. Id at 157 (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting). Judge Rosenn disagreed with the plurality's conclusion from
Sylvander: first, that parental rights termination cases do not override the in-
terest in finality; and second, that because the parent is seeking to protect his
or her right to raise the child and not the child's liberty interest, habeas corpus
custody is not present in termination cases. 648 F.2d at 158 (Rosenn, J., dissent-
ing).
62. Id.
63. Id. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1976).
64. 648 F.2d at 158-59 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S.
131, 134 (1934) (tracing development of writ at common law). See also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (current ver-
sion at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)) reads in pertinent part:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, [District, Cir-
cuit, and Supreme] shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions [else-
where defined], and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And
that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the
1982] 303
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Rosenn discussed the four requirements for the exercise of juris-
diction. 5 He observed that the first requirement, custody, had
been expanded beyond physical confinement or restraint to in-
clude protection against wrongful restraints of an individual's
liberty." Judge Rosenn asserted that the state's supervision of
the children in the present case was sufficient to reach the level
of custody required by the statute; therefore, the plurality's
reliance on Sylvander was misplaced. 7
This dissenter noted that the second requirement under the
federal habeas corpus act, custody in violation of a federal law or
the Constitution, had been satified by Ms. Lehman's allegations
that her children's custody violated the Constitution.68
Judge Rosenn observed that the third requirement, custody
granted pursuant to a judgment by a state court, had been met. 9
By pursuing her constitutional arguments through to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, Ms. Lehman had met the final require-
district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause -of commitment.-Provided, That
writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless
where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the
United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same,
or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Id. at 81-82.
65. 648 F.2d at 159 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra note 21.
66. 648 F.2d at 160 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. at 243. See also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. at 349 (release on
own recognizance constitutes habeas corpus custody); Westberry v. Keith, 434
F.2d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (actual physical restraint not required
to obtain habeas corpus relief); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705; 711 (2d Cir.
1968) (naval reservist called to active duty although not yet reported for service
constitutes habeas corpus custody).
67. 648 F.2d at 160 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Ms. Lehman's petition was dis-
tinguishable from the Sylvander petition by the amount of state involvement,
asserted Judge Rosenn. In Lehman the state was involved not only in the
statutory judicial proceedings, but also by the fact a county agency had custody
of the children. Id. Judge Rosenn asserted that the Sylvander court itself found
this distinction important. Id. See Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1112.68. 648 F.2d at 161 (Roseen, J., dissenting). Ms. Lehman alleged that sec-
tion 311(2) of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act of 1970 was unconstitutionally
vague on its face and as applied to her; that parental rights termination
violated the fourteenth amendment by failure to use less drastic measures; and
that the state, absent of finding a failure to provide adequate care or exposure
of children to substantial harm, had no compelling interest in the termination.
Id at 160-61 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 161 (Roseen, J., dissenting). In re William Lehman, Nos. 2986-88
(C.P. Lycoming County filed June 3, 1976).
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ment of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, exhaustion of state
remedies.7" Judge Rosenn therefore concluded that federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction was available to Ms. Lehman unless over-
riding policy concerns present reasons for not asserting juris-
diction.
Judge Rosenn disagreed with the plurality's reasoning that
even if jurisdiction were available under section 2254, the
countervailing state interest in finality of judgments and the fed-
eral courts' deference to the state in matters of family law would
override the federal interest in protecting personal liberty from
unconstitutional deprivation." Judge Rosenn contended that
rather than deferring to states in the area of family law, the
plurality's holding would prevent the federal courts from review-
ing state court rulings on federal constitutional claims like Ms.
Lehman's. The plurality's decision that the present case did not
impinge with sufficient harshness on any liberty interest was, ac-
cording to Judge Rosenn, not supported by case law.3
Examining whether the exercise of habeas jurisdiction ad-
vanced federal-state comity; Judge Rosenn recognized the federal
courts' hesitation to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations
suits,74 but distinguished the present case because Pennsylvania
had deprived children of their liberty in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.75 Because section 1983 complaints prevail
over the federal deferral policy in such cases, Judge Rosenn
asserted that when the. same allegations are brought forth in a
habeas corpus petition, they also should prevail."
Judge Rosenn did not view the dispute as a struggle over
70. 648 F.2d at 161 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 162 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra note 36.
73. Id. at 162 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. at 351; Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d at 711. See supra note 66.
74. Id. at 162 (Roseen, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn noted that Sylvander
had identified two principal factors that work against the exercise of federal
habeas jurisdiction: (1) while furthering only a collateral federal interest, exer-
cise of jurisdiction would interfere with significant state regulatory interests in
family matters; and (2) other avenues of procedure provide adequate protection
for federal constitutional rights. Id. See supra note 21. See also In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (matters of domestic relations belong to laws of the
states); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (divorce decree of sup-
port remanded to state court due to federal policy and comity concerns).




which parent should raise the child, but as a constitutional attack
against a state statute that authorized the termination of paren-
tal rights without consent.7 He regarded this action as one akin
to criminal prosecution, finding the destruction of the family re-
lationship by the state only one step short of imposing criminal
sanctions to protect neglected children. 8 Judge Rosenn therefore
found it unrealistic to propose that jurisdiction extended in this
case would necessarily lead to the exercise of jurisdiction in
custody battles between natural parents. 9
Judge Rosenn urged that significant federal interests were in-
volved in Lehman. He observed that the right to family privacy
includes the parent's right to manage his or her children and the
children's right to be raised by their natural parents. 0 Judge
Rosenn stated that the relationship between parent and child has
constitutional protection,"1 and that the Supreme Court has held
that natural parents have rights that the state may not infringe.82
Examining whether federal-state comity considerations ren-
dered the extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction inappropriate,
Judge Roseen asserted that Ms. Lehman's state court adjudica-
tion of her federal constitutional allegations, instead of being a
bar to federal action as was urged by the Agency, fulfilled the
federal habeas corpus statute requirement that state remedies
be exhausted before seeking a federal forum.'
Concluding that the commonwealth had terminated a constitu-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 163 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979),
the Supreme Court stated that "the temporary removal of a child in a child
abuse context is ... in aid of and is closely related to criminal statutes." Id. at
423.
79. 648 F.2d at 163 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 163-64 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. at 166. See also Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624 (1980); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect
Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 720 (1979).
81. 648 F.2d at 164 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn noted that the
Supreme Court has stated that an individual has the right to a family relation-
ship free of unwarranted state intrusion. Id. at 164 n.11 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
82. 648 F.2d at 164 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
at 652 (the interest in retaining custody of children one has sired and raised is
substantial and cognizable).
83. 648 F.2d at 166-67 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn noted that ex-
haustion of state remedies, a requirement for federal jurisdiction under the ha-
beas corpus statute, operated to preclude later federal action under section
1983. See supra notes 25 & 36.
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tionally protected relationship and had taken custody of the
children, Judge Rosenn believed that federal habeas corpus was
a remedy available to Ms. Lehman because: (1) unless compelling
interests were present to urge its nonconferral, Congress had
made federal habeas corpus available to cure unlawful restraint
if the statutory requirements were met, and Ms. Lehman had
satisfied those requirements;4 (2) this case involves the power of
the state to terminate the mutual parent and child liberty in-
terests, and there is a federal interest in insuring a constitu-
tional proceeding;' and (3) both state and federal interests are
served by the exhaustion requirements which grant federal re-
view of federal constitutional claims only after these claims are
presented to the state court.86
Judge Gibbons, also dissenting," disagreed with his fellow
judges' treatment of habeas corpus as a ground for federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. He contended that habeas corpus here is
a remedy, available to assist the court in exercising its jurisdic-
tion. Custody, he stated, was pertinent only if Ms. Lehman were
victorious in her constitutional challenge to the termination pro-
cedures. If she prevailed, then the state would not have custodial
rights to the children, and the remedy of habeas corpus could be
used to obtain their return." Finding subject matter jurisdiction
under separate authority,89 Judge Gibbons asserted that the case
84. 648 F.2d at 167 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra notes 65-70 and ac-
companying text.
85. 648 F.2d at 167 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra notes 81 & 90 and ac-
companying text.
86. 648 F.2d at 168 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See supra note 83 and accompa-
nying text. Judge Rosenn stated that the question of the children's custody
should still be resolved solely by the state court, but within federal constitu-
tional guidelines. 648 F.2d at 168 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
87. 648 F.2d at 168 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (1976) (Supp. III
1979). Section 1331(a) reads as follows: "(a) The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treateis of the United States. Section
1343(a) reads, in pertinent part:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
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should be remanded to determine the res judicata effect of the
state's decision to terminate parental rights."
Discussing habeas corpus as a remedy and not as a basis for
extending jurisdiction, Judge Gibbons observed that section 14
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was a grant of power to the courts
to issue certain writs necessary to jurisdiction, while jurisdiction
was defined elsewhere.91 The power to issue writs of habeas cor-
pus, as interpreted by Judge Gibbons, is limited only in those
circumstances where a single judge is reviewing a jail commit-
ment. In civil cases, the court is not so limited.92 Therefore,
Judge Gibbons disagreed with Judge Adams' view that federal ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction has had a history of carefully controlled
statutory development93 and maintained that instead, the power
of courts to issue habeas corpus writs is grounded in common
law.94 Thus, defining the key issue in the present case as
whether obtaining custody of children through habeas corpus
was permissible at common law, Judge Gibbons found that it
clearly was permissible.9"
Examining whether Ms. Lehman had stated facts under which
she could prove a claim within the district court's jurisdiction,
Judge Gibbons stated that a basis in federal law and a jurisdic-
tional statute are the requisites for establishing a claim within
the jurisdiction of the district court." He found both present in
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
Id-
90. 648 F.2d at 168 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
91. I1& at 169 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
92. Id.' Judge Gibbons suggested that because the use of writs in civil
litigation was common at the time the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed, the
phrase "inquiry into cause of commitment" implied application to civil com-
mitments also. Id.
93. Id at 170 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See 648 F.2d at 148 (Adams, J., con-
curring).
94. 648 F.2d at 170 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 171 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
at 238-39 (use of habeas corpus at common law in family custody situations). See
also supra note 23 and infra note 115 and accompanying text.
96. 648 F.2d at 172 (Gibbons, J , dissenting). Judge Gibbons disagreed with
Judge Garth's suggestion that this question involves the inherent right to have




Ms. Lehman's due process complaint. 7 Judges Adams and Garth
had dealt with res judicata and standing, defenses going to the
merits which, Judge Gibbons pointed out, do not deal with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 8 He observed that several statutory
bases for subject matter jurisdiction were available to provide
Ms. Lehman with a federal forum.9
Questioning the standing arguments discussed by Judge Adams,
Judge Gibbons stated again that the treatment of habeas corpus
as a jurisdictional matter had caused the erroneous conclusions;
Ms. Lehman was not suing for custody per se, but challenging
the termination proceedings. 0 He stated that Ms. Lehman had
standing to assert her own rights, and that custody would be
awarded as a remedy only if she suceeded 1'
Judge Gibbons asserted that the only true issue in this case
was whether dismissal by the district court was required under
the doctrine of res judicata.'2 He stated, however, that even if
Pennsylvania considers parental termination decrees final for res
judicata purposes 03 such a decree against Ms. Lehman could not
be given preclusive effect if her claims of unconstitutionality
were vaild. °4
Although the origin of the habeas corpus writ is uncertain, it
97. 648 F.2d at 172 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) would afford jurisdiction over
a claim based on due process violations. Id See supra note 89.
98. 648 F.2d at 173 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
99. Id Judge Gibbons mentioned specifically that a federal forum is avail-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). See supra notes 36 & 89.
100. 648 F.2d at 174 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Judge Gibbons stated that the statutory requirement of full faith and
credit has the effect of binding the federal district court to the extent a render-
ing state would be bound by a judgment of its own courts. Id at 175 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting). See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) which provides in pertinent part:
"Such . . . judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State . . . from which they are taken."
Judge Gibbons noted that Pennsylvania case law suggests that parental ter-
mination proceedings can be reopened and modified. 648 F.2d at 175 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting). See In re adoption of R. H., 485 Pa. 157, 401 A.2d 341 (1979) (in-
voluntary decree might have been reversed if mother had met her burden of
proving decree's invalidity).
104. 648 F.2d at 177 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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was in general use in England by 1150.05 The writ entered
American jurisprudence through English common law'016 and the
Constitution preserved its use.'01 The Judiciary Act of 1789, "0 a
forerunner of the current habeas corpus statute, 10 authorized the
writ's use by the federal judiciary. While the 1789 Act is found
substantially unchanged in the current habeas corpus statute,
the statute has undergone additions by Congress110 and extension
by the courts."'
Federal habeas corpus was originally available only to individ-
uals in federal custody.'12 In 1867, an amendment to the Judiciary
Act gave the federal courts the authority to extend the writ to
individuals held in custody by a state, if held in violation of a
federal law, treaty, or the Constitution. Although the usual ap-
plication of habeas corpus has been to challenge the lawfulness of
an individual's custody under criminal convictions, the courts
have extended the interpretation of the "custody" element be-
yond the criminal realm."'
In a 1963 decision, Jones v. Cunningham,1 5 the United States
105. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969). By the early thir-
teenth century, the writ was used by the King's Court in their attempt to
assert control over local courts. Id at 4 (citing Cohen, Some Considerations of
the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CANADIAN BAR REV. 92, 115 (1938)).
106. SOKOL, supra note 105, at 4 (citing Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States
1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247 (1965)).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 which provides: "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
108. See supra note 64.
109. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1976). See supra note 25.
110. Judiciary Act of 1789, The Force Act, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 634, Act of Aug.
29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385, and Act of
Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 940.
111. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). The Court reviewed the
English common law scope of the habeas corpus writ and also the history of the
writ in the United States. On the basis of this review, the court determined the
"custody" requirement of the habeas corpus statute did not mean actual
physical restraint in a prison. Id. at 238-40.
112. See supra note 64.
113. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1976)). See supra note 25.
114. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 238-40 (citing precedents for ha-
beas corpus writ availability in variety of noncriminal cases); Ex parte
McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 816 (1867) (every deprivation of liberty in violation
of federal law is within jurisdiction of every judge or court).
115. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Jones had been convicted by a Virginia state court
and sentenced to a state penitentiary. His petition to the United States District
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Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "custody" to deter-
mine whether the statutory jurisdictional requisites for habeas
corpus had been met. ' In light of the writ's purpose to protect
against unlawful restraints on an individual's personal liberty,"7
the Court held that physical restraint was not the test, but
rather whether the type of restraint in question was a sort "not
shared by the public generally."'" 8 As Congress had not attempted
to place parameters on the term "custody," the Jones Court de-
termined that both English and American common law and his-
torical uses may be used to determine whether habeas corpus
was the appropriate vehicle for examining a particular restraint
on liberty."9 Interestingly, several of the common law cases cited
as support by the Jones Court specifically involved the custody
of children.'20
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on
whether federal habeas corpus can be used to challenge parental
termination cases,'"' federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been
invoked in a variety of contexts as a means of challenging the
state's custody of a child:'" pre-trial detention'23 and post-adjudic-
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus was dis-
missed. The court of appeals granted leave to appeal. Just before oral argu-
ment, Jones was paroled and placed in the custody of the Parole Board. The
court of appeals then dismissed the case as moot. The Supreme Court, on ap-
peal, held that parole was "custody" for purposes of the habeas corpus statute
and therefore, entitled to the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal district
court. Id. at 242-43.
116. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1976). See supra note 25.
117. 371 U.S. at 243.
118. Id. at 240. See also Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d at 711 (enlisted
naval reservist in "custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus statute).
119. 371 U.S. at 238.
120. Id at 239. The court cited Rex. v. Delaval, 97 Eng.Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763)
(habeas corpus issued to bring 18-year-old indentured servant into court); Rex.
v. Clarkson, 93 Eng.Rep. 625 (K.B. 1722) (habeas corpus to obtain release of
minor from guardian); Earl of Westmeath v. Countess of Westmeath, as set out
in reporter's footnote in Lyons v. Blenkin, 37 Eng.Rep. 842, 848 (Ch. 1821)
(habeas corpus used by one parent to obtain release of children from the other
parent).
121. See Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1109.
122. Brief for Appellant at 17. See supra notes 112-15.
123. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971) (habeas corpus
used to test detention before state proceedings); Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209
(9th Cir. 1970) (release of juvenile obtained to aid in preparation of own
defense); Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (failure to exhaust
state remedies not bar to habeas corpus petition under circumstances given).
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ative placements of juvenile delinquents, 24 institutional com-
mitments of mentally retarded youths,'25 and various other civil
commitments 2 ' by state courts.
Lehman is one of three recent courts of appeals decisions using
federal habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of state
proceedings for terminating the parent-child relationship.
Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers 7 was
the-first case to decide that federal habeas corpus was not avail-
able because the statutory requisite of "custody" simply was not
present in child custody cases involving parental termination.'28
Despite Jones' expansive interpretation of custody,'29 the Sylvan-
der court reasoned that common law usages were inappropriate
as a means for ascertaining the scope of the writ in child custody
cases because of the state's reserved jurisdiction in the area."'
Because the only federal interest in such a case would be a con-
stitutional challenge, the Sylvander court stated that federal in-
trusion into the realm of reserved state jurisdiction requires that
the intrusion be necessary and appropriate."'
Questioning whether the child's interest would truly be served
by conferring federal habeas corpus status on the parent, the
Sylvander court pointed out that other avenues for federal
review are available without resort to federal habeas corpus.'3 '
The court expressed a concern that if habeas corpus were made
available in this type of case, federal courts would be involved in
a vast new area of judicial review. Deciding that the true issue
in the case was who would raise the child, the Sylvander court
124. See, e.g., United States ex reL Diggs v. Pennsylvania, 457 F.2d 933 (3d
Cir. 1972) (habeas corpus petition denied for lack of final state adjudication on
delinquency); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (release of juvenile
from receiving home was proper under habeas corpus petition); Creek v. Stone,
379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (habeas corpus petition claiming lack of psychiatric
care vitiated rationale for confinement).
125. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (absence of counsel at
hearing for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded youth).
126. See supra note 120.
127. 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
128. 584 F.2d at 1111.
129. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130. 584 F.2d at 1111.
131. Id.
132. Id See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1343 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See
supra note 89.
133. 584 F.2d at 1113.
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held that the mother could not litigate further her right to raise
the child by using habeas corpus."'
After Sylvander, the Fifth Circuit reached a different result in
Davis v. Page.'33 Ms. Davis's child was removed from her custody
by a state agency, adjudicated dependent, and made a ward of
the State of Florida. 3 ' The District Court for the Southern
District of Florida 37 granted summary judgment for Ms. Davis
on her habeas corpus petition seeking return of her child, and a
panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed.'38 On rehearing en banc,139 the
134. Id.
135. 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981). Ms. Davis's child had been removed from
her custody by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(DHRS) which had also filed for a dependency hearing. Ms. Davis was advised
to have counsel present at that hearing. She was unable to locate counsel, prob-
ably due to her indigency, and the child was adjudicated dependent and custody
was awarded to the DHRS. The 30-day appeal period expired, Ms. Davis retained
counsel and the habeas corpus petition was filed with the Florida Supreme
Court. Upon denial of the writ, an action for habeas corpus was filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on the grounds
that the hearing was unconstitutional because indigent parents are not
represented by counsel. Id. at 601.
136. Id.
137. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977). Ms. Davis had brought
a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the state's dependency
proceedings for failure to provide indigent parents with the assistance of
counsel. In granting the summary judgment, the court held that requirements
of due process and equal protection were not satisfied unless indigent parents
were advised of their right to counsel. Id. at 263-65.
138. Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted. The Lehman court characterized this decision as one which assumed,
rather than discussed, jurisdiction. See 648 F.2d at 141 n.8.
139. 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
The court held that in formal dependency proceedings which threaten -to
deprive the parent of even temporary custody, an indigent parent must be of-
fered counsel. Having found federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit
went on to decide the constitutional due process issue involved. During the
course of the analysis of the due process issue, the interest of the parent was
found to be a fundamental and absolute liberty interest and the interest in family
integrity was likened to the individual interest in freedom from restraint. 640
F.2d at 604. The Davis decision was issued over a strong dissent which agreed
in many respects with the Sylvander analysis, particularly as to concerns of
federalism, comity, and res judicata. The dissent, agreeing with the result of
the Sylvander court, was concerned with the sort of "custody" represented by
parental rights cases and with whose interest in truly represented in a habeas
petition. Availability of litigation in both state and federal courts and its affect
on the interests of the family and child were discussed and resolved in accord
with Sylvander. This was true also of the dissent's concern with the difficulty in
limiting the child custody cases brought before federal courts via habeas cor-
pus. 640 F.2d at 607 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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Davis court had no difficulty finding the requisite "custody" by
using the Jones analysis of restraints.4 ' Even recognizing the
deference owed state courts in family law matters, Davis found
no authority that would require denying the habeas corpus peti-
tion simply because the issue involved child custody."' In fact,
the court rejected outright the state's contention that habeas
corpus was inappropriate in child custody cases."' The Davis
court limited its holding to those situations where the state's in-
volvement affected the family's integrity, and stated that it did not
include those situations concerned with purely private parties. 3
Lehman is the most recent decision on termination of paren-
tal rights and federal habeas corpus. The power of the writ to
overcome the res judicata principle of finality of litigation was
the ever-present factor throughout the plurality's analysis. Such
power, to be exercised between federal and state judicial sys-
tems, is without comparison in our federal system."' Relying ex-
tensively on the Sylvander analysis, the Lehman plurality viewed
the issue before it as an ordinary child custody dispute, analog-
ous to a dispute between the father and mother."5 The Lehman
court found the facts to be insufficient to meet the unconstitu-
tionally incarcerated prisoner standard," ' and therefore to over-
come the compelling interest in finality, because viewed from the
aspect of an ordinary child custody dispute, the Lehman children
were not in custody sufficient to meet the requisites established
through prior cases." 7 The restraints imposed on the Lehman
children were seen to be no different than those imposed on any
other child subjected to some type of parental-like authority. De-
spite authority suggesting that resort to common law usages is
proper,"8 the Lehman plurality stated that it would limit its ex-
140. 640 F.2d at 602. Because the child was returned home, some of the
mother's "restraints" not shared by the public generally were: The
Department's continuing supervision of the child; the mother's required visits
with the social worker; the inspections of her home by the social worker; and
the general supervision over the mother's decisions regarding the child. Id
141. Id.
142. I& at 603.
143. Id. at 605.
144. 648 F.2d at 138-39.
145. Id. at 143.
146. Id. at 140.
147. Id. at 141.
148. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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amination of authority to those cases where the federal courts
extended the writ to children in "custody" pursuant to a ter-
mination proceeding."9 This limitation, in conjunction with the
court's treatment of the case as an ordinary child custody dis-
pute, led the court to what it deemed to be only available prece-
dent, Sylvander.'50 But Sylvander can be distinguished from
Lehman because the Sylvander child was in the custody of a pri-
vate institution and not the state. Indeed, the Sylvander court
had emphasized the lack of state involvement as an important
element in arriving at its decision.'5 '
This element of state involvement is prevalent in the Lehman
case; however, the Lehman plurality shifted the focus of its anal-
ysis from the degree of state involvement to the status"' of the
child, and claimed that such status would not be affected even if
further litigation were available. This shift allowed the plurality
to reach the same conclusion as the Sylvander court, that the only
issue to be relitigated in the habeas corpus action would be the
parent's right to raise the children,'53 an issue that federal courts
have traditionally deferred to the states.'54 Also, according to
Lehman, if it is a parent's right that is being pressed, habeas
corpus is certainly not the appropriate vehicle to relitigate his or
her claim because the writ protects against unlawful restraint
and the parent is not under any state-imposed detention or re-
straint.'55 Therefore, the Lehman plurality, like the Sylvander
court, found the mother to be asserting her own rights and not
bringing suit on behalf of the children. 6
149. 648 F.2d at 136, 142.
150. Id. at 141. The court's only reference to the panel decision in Davis was
in a footnote. Id. at 141 n.8. The Lehman court found the panel decision in
Davis to be unhelpful and unpersuasive because the court assumed without
much discussion that habeas corpus jurisdiction was present. Id.
151. 584 F.2d at 1109. The court stated that "[tihe district court found that
Michael, although living with foster parents, remained under the supervision
and control of the Home, 'a private non-profit agency engaged in child care,' and
that this was sufficient to constitute 'custody' in the Home." 444 F. Supp. at
398. But it concluded that the necessary element of state involvement was lack-
ing. Id.
152. 648 F.2d at 142.
153. Id. at 140.
154. 584 F.2d at 1112.
155. 648 F.2d at 140. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.




Policy considerations in a child custody situation also per-
suaded the Lehman plurality to affirm the dismissal of the writ.
Discussed in Sylvander and reiterated in Lehman was the child's
inability, unlike the incarcerated prisoner, to end the litigation if
a federal forum via habeas corpus were made available. In light
of this, the Lehman plurality was unable to find how the family
or child's welfare would benefit by providing yet another
forum."7
In light of the nearly exclusive reliance on Sylvander and the
lack of any references of the Davis discussion, it must be assumed
that the Lehman plurality was unaware of Davis, decided only
one week previously. 58 The three cases viewed together reveal a
strong division about the availability and scope of federal habeas
corpus when the issue involves a child custody dispute between
parents and the state.'59
The Sylvander-Lehman opinions are similar to the Davis dis-
sent in outlining the issue as an ordinary child custody case, with
their concern about whether the required "custody" exists, and
about the impact on federalism if habeas corpus were available.'
All three cases were concerned with the difficulty in limiting the
application of the writ if it were granted in the present cases.
The Davis majority and the Lehman dissents agree that the
situation complies with the jurisdictional requirements, in par-
ticular that of custody, and that principles evidenced by feder-
alism-concerns are not harmed by granting the habeas corpus ac-
tion. 8'
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari... in
Lehman to examine whether habeas corpus can be utilized by a
parent to obtain federal constitutional review of fully exhausted
state parental rights termination proceedings on behalf of child-
ren who as a result of the proceedings are in state custody.
Perhaps the key to the divergence of opinion in the circuits,
157. 648 F.2d at 144. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
158. The en banc decision in Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981), was
rendered March 23, 1981; Lehman was rendered March 31, 1981.
159. Sylvander was the only unanimous decision.
160. See supra notes 31 & 133 and accompanying text. See also 640 F.2d at
605 (Brown, J., dissenting).
161. See supra notes 65, 96 & 139 and accompanying text.




and what will be determinative in the Supreme Court's con-
sideration, is the initial characterization of the case. If character-
ized as an ordinary child custody case, the rights being urged
will be viewed as those involving who shall raise the child to ma-
jority. Certainly no severe restraint can be found by being placed
in temporary foster custody, and thus all traditional and common
law authority will demand deference by the federal courts to the
state's resolution. However, if characterized as a case in which a
state agency has custody, meaning that the control, supervision
and care is in the state itself, the results are diametrically dif-
ferent. The state has then interfered with the right to the in-
tegrity of the family and severed the fundamental parental right
in one's children by allegedly unconstitutional means. When a
state's highest court has upheld the federal constitutionality of
such proceedings, then such a characterization easily falls within
the broad scope of habeas corpus.' 3
Dru Hanna Schoenborn
163. See supra notes 25 & 39 and accompanying text.
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